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ble."98 Unfortunately, a complete record is not always available. In addition, the concept of "abuse of discretion" is shadowy and is used in a
variety of ways in a variety of contexts." Furthermore, the language of
section 701(a)(2) I compounds the confusion by purporting to preclude
review of "abuse of discretion."'' 01
What is apparently needed is for courts to recognize that "abuse of
discretion" is in and of itself an empty concept. The same can be said
for "agency action committed to agency discretion by law." The requirements of a balance between efficient administrative apparatus on one
hand and protection of individual interests on the other require the sort
of analysis and attitude taken by the First Circuit in Hahn. Using as a
starting point the recognition of both the presumption of reviewability
and the necessity of clear congressional intent to preclude review of administrative action, factors such as appropriateness of the issues for judicial determination, the need for judicial supervision for the protection of
the plaintiff's interests, and the impact of the review on agency effectiveness can serve as guideposts for a fuller analysis in holdings of reviewability and nonreviewability. Although "guideposts" can evolve into "magical categories," these at least encourage probing and examination. The
result in Littell may have been correct, but the method involved can be
criticized as perpetuating a semantic debate as well as fostering the ensuing confusion.
JOHN C. MOORE

A RECONSIDERATION OF LIMITING PERJURY
PROSECUTIONS BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The acquittal on a criminal charge secured by the defendant's false
testimony suggests the possibility of his prosecution on a subsequent
charge for perjury. Since perjury is a separate crime, it technically avoids
the double jeopardy prohibition of a second trial for the same offense.'
11445 F.2d at 1209.
"Text accompanying notes 38-52 supra.
1115U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
1"1K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 at 964 (Supp. 1970).
'Double jeopardy prohibitions are typically defined as enunciated in Calvaresi v.
United States, 216 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'don other grounds, 348 U.S. 961 (1955):
The Fifth Amendment provides "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." That in plain
language means that one may not be tried a second time for the same
offense. ...
Id. at 902. See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946); M. FRIEDLAND,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 157 (1969).
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The rules of collateral estoppel, however, are encompassed by the double
jeopardy provisions 2 and may operate to foreclose the perjury action if
the matter can be said to have been decided in the previous trial.3 How
such a determination is to be made is the result of the court's weighing
of two countervailing considerations. The first is the desire to prevent
harassment of innocent victims by multiple prosecutions, and the second
is the desire to prevent deliberate false testimony from enabling defendants to remain unpunished for two crimes, the original crime and that
of perjury.
United States v. Nash,4 decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in September, 1971, explores one approach to resolving the problems and policies presented when deciding what matters are foreclosed
by a previous court's determination. Estelle 0. Nash had been found in
possession of three marked coins' allegedly obtained from a specially
prepared decoy letter used by postal authorities to aid in the detection of
mail thefts by postal employees.6 According to the observation of government witnesses, Nash had removed this test letter from a postal mail box
immediately prior to the discovery of the coins in her possession. 7 After
an acquittal on a charge for mail theft, Nash was indicted for perjury
regarding her explanation at the theft trial that she had obtained possession of the coins from a change machine.' To challenge that testimony,
the Government in the perjury trial produced essentially the same evidence as that offered in the previous trial, but added an elaborate explanation showing the impossibility of obtaining these particular coins from
the change machine Convicted on the perjury charge, Nash appealed
claiming that the issues and proof in the second trial constituted a repeti2

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). The Court noted that where the
actions are upon different claims, "the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel
only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which
the finding or verdict was rendered." Id. at 353. Collateral estoppel applies to criminal as
well as civil proceedings, United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). Oppenheimer,
however, applied collateral estoppel principles to criminal cases before the subsequent
embodiment of collateral estoppel as part of double jeopardy. This discussion will use the
terms "collateral estoppel" and "double jeopardy" in their strict rather than overlapping
sense.
'447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971).
Vd. at 1383. See also Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896); United States v.
Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1971), where the court observed that an "inference of
guilty knowledge may be drawn from the possession of recently stolen property ....
8447 F.2d at 1383.
7
1d.
8
1d. at 1383-84; Brief for Appellant at a3, United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th
Cir. 1971).
9447 F.2d at 1384, 1387.
3
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tion of the first trial and thus violated the double jeopardy protection of
the fifth amendment. 0 This contention was accepted by the Fourth Circuit which reversed the decision of the district court.
Although the appellate decision was ostensibly grounded upon theories of double jeopardy," the court's approach and technique in so deciding were actually those of collateral estoppel in the traditional and precise
use of the term.'2 This is because double jeopardy in the strict sense looks
to the similarity of the two offenses, here quite distinct, but collateral
estoppel looks to issues actually determined.' 3 Double jeopardy would
completely bar the second trial if the offenses were alike, but collateral
'estoppel bars only relitigation of the issues previously determined. 4 As
double jeopardy has been expanded in the recent case of Ashe v.
Swenson, 5 to include collateral estoppel, a court may now consider both
the offenses charged and the issues determined to detect violations of
double jeopardy.' 6 In Nash it was only the relitigation of issues determined which was violated by the second trial. Consequently, to overrule
the perjury conviction, the Nash court must have based its reasoning on
the collateral estoppel aspect of the enlarged double jeopardy provisions.
A frequent approach previously used to determine the validity of a
perjury trial was based upon the policy that a defendant acquitted of a
criminal charge should not be immune from the crime of perjury because
of collateral estoppel principles.' This philosophy provided blanket permission to proceed with all perjury trials and was widely adopted by the
state courts 8 on the theory, as expressed by the Virginia court, that
perjury is contrary to the proper administration of justice and "holds the
courts up to contempt when they allow the perjurer to go unpunished. '"'9
111d.
at 1383.
lid. at 1384.
"2The court's decision was based on tests prescribed by Sealfon v. United States, 332
U.S. 575, 579 (1948), which were evolved for res judicata standards and on res judicata dicta
in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 63 (1951).
"Notes I and 3 supra.
"Gershenson, Res Judicata in Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 24 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 12, 13-14 (1957).

15397 U.S. 436 (1970).

"1447 F.2d at 1384. As the alleged false testimony of Nash was the only issue in
question, the fate of the perjury trial would be identical if it violated either theory.
"People v. Barnes, 240 Cal. App. 2d 248, 49 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1966). The court stated:
To apply collateral estoppel would only immunize him from the crime of
perjury and reward his falsehood. Thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
is not available to the defendant in a prosecution for perjury.
id. at 473; see Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137 (1916); People v. Niles, 300 III.
458, 133 N.E. 252 (1921); State v. Leonard, 236 N.C. 126, 72 S.E.2d 1 (1952).
"Note 17 supra.
"Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 38 S.E.2d 485, 491 (1946).
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It was felt that public policy did not condone granting immunity to
criminals and that this was the inevitable result of extending collateral
estoppel doctrines to perjury.20 The courts which agreed with this position, but did not categorically desire to always allow perjury trials, simply
found that the2issue in question was not decided by the fact finders in the
previous trial. '
The Fourth Circuit's application of the Ashe v. Swenson rationale to
a perjury trial situation would seem to preclude consistently allowing
perjury trials without giving due regard to collateral estoppel principles.
As part of the fifth amendment, the collateral estoppel principles of
double jeopardy are applicable to the states.2 2 In addition to this constitutional mandate, there were inherent difficulties with the concept of always
allowing perjury trials. First was the emphasis on the complete separateness between the original criminal offense and the perjury offense. z3 In
the extreme, this would ignore any meaningful consideration of what the
jury may have decided in reaching its verdict and would fail to preclude
subsequent trials even if the evidence presented in both trials was identical. Secondly, there appeared to be no concern about the possibility that
two verdicts arising out of similar facts may be inconsistent. 24 The resulting consequence seemed to be that the one policy overshadowed all other
considerations and failed to give adequtae reasons for its total denial of
the policy protecting defendants from undue multiple prosecutions. 2
Although Ashe invalidated this strict policy treatment of perjury, the
"Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137, 139 (1916); see Hyman v. Regnestein,
258 F.2d 502, 510 (5th Cir. 1958).
21
State v. Noble, 2 Ariz. App. 532, 410 P.2d 489 (1966): People v. Di Giacomo, 193
Cal. App. 2d 688, 14 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1961); see Commonwealth v. Rose, 214 Pa. Super.
50, 251 A.2d 815 (1969).
2Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
23People v. Niles, 300 111.458, 133 N.E. 252, 254 (1921): Commonwealth v. Rose, 214
Pa. Super. 50, 251 A.2d 815 (1969). In Rose the court noted that "[tihe offense of perjury
is committed and completed at the time the false testimony is given, regardless of the
outcome of the proceeding in which it occurs." Id. at 817, quoting Commonwealth v.
Hilton, 265 Pa. 353, 355, 108 A. 828 (1919).
2
1People v. Niles, 300 Ill. 458, 133 N.E. 252 (1921); State v. Leonard, 236 N.C. 126,
72 S.E.2d 1 (1952): cf Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701, 704 (5th Cir. 1961). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(I)(c)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
458, 133 N.E. 252 (1921) dismissed the possible
2The court in People v. Niles, 300 111.
abuses that might arise in always allowing perjury trials by stating:
[Sluch situations are no more probable than that an innocent man might
be convicted of any other crime by perjured testimony of his enemies
conspiring against him, or that he might be harrassed by a corrupt prosecuting attorney. The possibility of such wrong is too remote to have any
controlling influence on the important principle at stake.
Id. at 254.
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opinion did offer some guidelines for determining if collateral estoppel
forecloses subsequent perjury actions. Such a determination is to be made
with "realism and rationality" by looking to "all the circumstances of the
proceedings." 2 The objective of this approach is to avoid the "hypertechnical" ' z application of collateral estoppel rules. Included within these
guidelines are two traditional theories for determining what issues were
decided at the first trial, the "same evidence" test and the "necessarily
adjudicated" test."
The "same evidence" theory focuses on what new and additional
evidence the Government produces to support its perjury claim." As set
forth by the Fourth Circuit in the leading case of Allen v. United
States,"0
it is very hard to imagine any state of things which would justify
an indictment for perjury of an acquitted defendant against whom
the government offers no other substantial evidence than that
which had been before the jury which had found him not guilty.3'
The only direct acknowledgement of this test in the Nash decision is by
Judge Winter in his concurring opinion in which he based his conclusion
solely on the "identity of the evidence at both trials." 32 The effect of this
approach would be to limit the majority's conclusion, as understood by
Judge Winter, "that the government is forever foreclosed from prosecuting [Nash] for perjury."' If new evidence were produced, the perjury
trial would be held permissible on the basis that the additional proof
34
would not have been decided by the previous jury.
Advantages of the "same evidence" test appear to be twofold. First
is the relative clarity and ease of application of the test to any particular
set of facts. This aids judicial economy by reducing needless litigation.
Second, the test permits perjury trials when the Government demon2397 U.S. at 444, quotingin part Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948).
2Note 26 supra.
2397 U.S. at 443-46.
"447 F.2d at 1387 (Winter, J., concurring); see Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241,
242 (10th Cir. 1929); Youngblood v. United States, 266 F. 795 (8th Cir. 1920).
30194
F. 664 (4th Cir. 1912).
31
1d. at 667. The court continued by saying:
The government and its prosecuting officers should not discredit the verdicts and judgments of its own courts by seeking to induce one jury to find
that another gave a wrong verdict upon what is in all material respects
the same testimony.

Id.
3447 F.2d at 1387 (Winter, J., concurring).
1Id.
341d.
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strates that it has obtained new evidence. The proper administration of
justice is thus protected by discouraging defendants from offering false
testimony at the first trial.
A weakness of the "same evidence" test. may be its dependence upon
distinguishing exactly what is new evidence from what eventually proves
to be merely cumulative evidence. For example, in the Nash case the
impossibility of receiving the marked coins from the change machine was
conclusively proved in the perjury trial but was not so proved in the mail
theft trial.3 5 If this impossibility of receiving the coins had been treated
as new evidence, then the perjury conviction would have had a foundation
on which to have been upheld under the "same evidence" test. The concurring judge, however, felt the testimony contained nothing new or different.3 6 When only cumulative evidence is presented, the courts cannot
sanction any rule which would permit a prosecutor a second chance simply because he discovers a better and more convincing method to bolster
37
his case.
This difficulty of distinguishing new evidence from merely new approaches to the same evidence may produce unfortunate results not only
in the validity of the second trial, but also in the protection of constitutional guarantees. Just as the proper administration of the laws may be
frustrated by labeling new evidence merely cumulative, the right of a
defendant to be free from undue multiple prosecutions may also be frustrated by labeling cumulative evidence as something new or different.
Thus Ashe seems justified in adopting a more general approach to collateral estoppel inquiries than merely an exclusive and strict "same evidence" rule.3 s The difficulties with this rule, however, do not suggest that
"Id. at 1384; Brief for Appellee at 2-3; Brief for Appellant at 3-4. The change machine
could not recycle the marked coins into change for dollars as was implicit in the defendant's
claim.
36
Judge Winter noted that the impossibility of getting the coins from the machine was
in evidence at the first trial and continued:
It is true that, at the perjury trial, the government sought to bolster this
aspect of its case by offering a corroborating witness. But his testimony
was not new or different; it was merely cumulative.
447 F.2d at 1387 (Winter, J., concurring).
37
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970); Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502 (5th
Cir. 1958); Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241,242 (10th Cir. 1929); see Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
The "same evidence" test meets sharp criticism from some courts who would exchange it for the "same transaction" test. See United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Butler, 38 F. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1889). This view is strongly
espoused by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Ashe, 397 U.S. at 448-60. Justice
Brennan summarized:
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution. . . to
join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a
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its usefulness is diminisfied, but only that a broader approach is desirable
in cases not readily adaptable to a mere comparison of the evidence.

This broader approach is the "necessarily adjudicated" test, as advanced by the Supreme Court in Sealfon v. United States.39 The case
involved the question of whether an acquittal on a conspiracy charge
would preclude a subsequent prosecution for the substantive offense. The

Court promulgated a test declaring that if a matter which was "crucial"
and "necessarily adjudicated""0 at the first trial is an identical matter in
the second trial, then the Government is precluded from obtaining a
conviction on the second charge. This determination "depends upon the
facts adduced at each trial and the instructions under which the jury
arrived at its verdict at the first trial. ' 41 The circuit court in Nash directly
applied this test to its view of the evidence. 2 The potential difficulties of

the Sealfon approach become apparent, however, when observing that
this is the identical test used by the district court in reaching the opposite
43
result.
In determining if the change machine story was an adjudicated issue
at the previous trial, the circuit court arrived at the conclusion that only
single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction. This "same transaction" test of "same offense" not only enforces the ancient prohibition
against vexatious multiple prosecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy
Clause, but responds as well to the increasingly widespread recognition
that the consolidation in one lawsuit of all issues arising out of a single
transaction or occurrence best promotes justice, economy, and convenience.
Id. at 454-54. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.07(2), 1.09(l)(b)(Proposed Official Draft
1962). The "same transaction" test protects the defendant against undue multiple prosecutions, but it creates uncertainties in determining if perjury on the witness stand is part of
the original transaction or whether it is a new and separate offense. If it is part of the
original transaction then all future perjury prosecutions would be foreclosed by definition.
Yet if it is a completely separate offense, then all perjury trials would have to be permitted.
This conclusion would seem to weaken the effectiveness of the test for perjury situations.
-332 U.S. 575 (1948).
11Id. at 580.
11Id. at 579, cited in, 447 F.2d at 1385. The instructions under which the jury arrived
at its verdict in the Nash theft trial stated "that the Government was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did steal, take or abstract the letter from the
mails before she could be convicted." Brief for Appellant at a9.
"After citing the Supreme Court decision, the court stated:
Following the prescriptions in Sealfon and Ashe, we conclude that the jury
in the first case undoubtedly passed upon the believability of Estelle
Nash's statements made under oath.
447 F.2d at 1385.
I'The district court principally relies on Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th
Cir. 1961) and to a lesser degree on United States v. Davis, 369 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1966)
both of which rely on the Sealfon test. Brief for Appellant at a8-al3.
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"two conflicting explanations of her possession [were] considered.""
There was the testimony of the defendant and that of the Government.
It was thus "inconceivable that there would have been an acquittal if the
jury had not accorded truth to her testimony."' 5 This conclusion diametrically opposed the viewpoint of the district court in the perjury case; the
district court noted that the record of the theft trial indicated it would
have been "difficult, if not almost impossible"'" for the government's
witness to have 7observed Nash take the letter and, further, that there was
"serious issue"' as to whether she even had the opportunity to remove
the letter. Thus the district court concluded that the Government may
have failed to prove its mail theft case without the jury having to decide
the veracity of the defendant's story as to the change machine.' Moreover, there are other questions not mentioned by either court which seemingly might have led a jury to believe that there were more than two
explanations for Nash's possession of the coins.'
The question then arises, because of these different conclusions,
whether the Sealfon test itself is faulty or whether there was error in its
application by one of the two Nash courts. The first explanation for the
diverse results is the differing views held by each court as to the significance of the evidence.5" The test is subjective and cannot determine which
matters were considered "essential"'" in the previous trial, as this decision
can only be made by each court as it looks to all the circumstances.
11447 F.2d at 1385.
451d.
4

Brief for Appellant at a9.
11d. at a10.
"Ild. at a9. The district court concluded:
All the jury decided was that the government had not established beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who took the letter
in question from the mails. That was not a finding that she obtained the
quarters from the change machine, or that the quarters did not come from
the letter.
7

Id.
"rThecoins were marked with a fluorescent powder but the results of tests to disclose
the powder on defendant's clothing were not given. There were also two marked bills along
with the coins in the test letter, but their whereabouts were not disclosed. Furthermore,
another woman was in the rest area where the defendant was discovered with the coins. This
may be important considering the credibility of the witness who claimed to have seen Nash
take the letter. Also there was no mention if the coffee was found that Nash purportedly
purchased with one of the quarters allegedly obtained from the change machine. 447 F.2d
at 1384; Brief for Appellant at 3. See also Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932).
0Text accompanying notes 16 & 47 supra.
51
Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948); Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d
701, 704 (5th Cir. 1961). In Adams the court also stated:
In this situation the authorities dealing directly with perjury prosecutions
clearly hold that when the fact is not necessarily determined in the former
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Whether or not the circuit court in Nash properly looked to all the
circumstances or whether it merely adopted the result of Sealfon, that
only one explanation existed to support the charges in each trial, 2 is open
to question.?3
A second explanation for the diverse results is that most courts applying the "necessarily adjudicated" test look to what the jury determined
as the basis for concluding what matters were adjudicated," while other
courts imply that they look directly to what the verdict itself determined."
The circuit court in Nash felt that the first jury could not escape passing
upon the credibility of Nash's change machine story, 8 while the district
court in the perjury action noted that the verdict necessarily determined
only the exact issue of mail theft. 7 In this latter "verdict" interpretation
of the Sealfon test, only those matters which were material for the government's case can be considered in determining the consistency of the
perjury verdict."8 To determine if the verdict as to perjury would be
inconsistent with the earlier holding, a trial court must revert to its own
interpretation of all the facts to decide which of those facts the verdict
determined, as opposed to those which were collateral and not necessarily
trial, the possibility that it may have bien does not prevent re-examination
of that issue (emphasis in original).
Id. at 705. See United States v. Davis, 369 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1966); see also Annot., 147
A.L.R.
1000-01 (1943).
52
After looking at the facts of each trial, the Court in Sealfon summarized:
As we read the records of the two trials, petitioner could be convicted of
either offense only on proof that he wrote the letter pursuant to an agreement with Greenberg. Under the evidence introduced, petitioner could
have aided and abetted Greenberg in no other way. Indeed, respondent
does not urge that he could.
332 U.S. at 580.
OSee Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948), see also Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Sealfon noted that the inquiry must be set in a "practical frame
and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings." 332 U.S. at 579. Note
49 supra.
"See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S.
575, 578-79 (1948).
-See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 65 (1951); Adams v. United States,
287 F.2d 701, 704 (5th Cir. 1961); Wheatley v. United States, 286 F.2d 519, 520 (10th Cir.
1961). In Williams the defendants were not found to be within the res judicata protection
of Sealfon as the charge of aiding and abetting was distinct from the charge of abuse of a
prisoner by police officers under color of state law. 341 U.S. at 64.
11447 F.2d at 1385.
57Brief for Appellant at a9.
5Id. at a13; see Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701,704-05 (5th Cir. 1961); Kuskulis

v. United States, 37 F.2d 241, 242 (10th Cir. 1929);
(p) (1942).

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

§ 68(o),
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decided.59 Thus the "jury" and "verdict" variations on the theme of "necessarily adjudicated" explain the flexibility that is available to courts in
applying the Sealfon test.
This flexibility, however desirable as an aid to avoiding the technical
applications of collateral estoppel, may cause the "necessarily adjudicated" test to be inadequate when applied to perjury situations. As the
Nash situation demonstrates, two different conclusions may be supported
by the test of issues "necessarily adjudicated" depending on the court's
particular viewpoint or emphasis. Thus the choice and interpretation
available to the courts would allow for a possible abuse of the safeguards
set down under the broadened double jeopardy concept. Moreover, this
flexibility precludes any attempt to predict the outcome of future cases
and thereby necessitates needless litigation.
A possible solution for this unpredictability may be the direct inclusion of the "same evidence" test into the "necessarily adjudicated" test.
While the "necessarily adjudicated" standards parallel those of collateral
estoppel, the "same evidence" rule parallels that of double jeopardy. 0
This results from the former test looking only to a particular issue to see
if it is barred from a subsequent relitigation, while the latter looks to the
entire case to see if the subsequent action must be completely foreclosed.
Consequently, a combination of these two tests would seem logical as
together they would emphasize both the collateral estoppel and double
jeopardy aspects of the Ashe decision.
Moreover, the advantages of both tests would be fully utilized. The
"same evidence" test would be invoked as a preliminary examination of
the previous trial, and it may often prove to be dispositive of the issue.
In more complicated situations, the "same evidence" approach would
serve as one of several indications of what may have been "necessarily
adjudicated". Thus the "necessarily adjudicated" test would gain a
sharper focus while still preserving its flexibility. Although not explicitly
stated, the combination of these two tests may have been utilized by some
federal courts. Admittedly, many of these courts adhere to the same
"'Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961). The court considered "as a
'collateral issue' any fact which, if established on the perjury trial to have been false, is not
inconsistent with the prior determination of innocence." Id. at 704.
"Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961). The court felt, especially when
the evidence is the same in both trials, that
some apprehension exists that allowing prosecution for perjury will actually give the state a second shot at the defendant for the same wrong.
• . . This, we see, approaches closely, whether acknowledged or not, an
intuitive feeling akin to double jeopardy despite the fact that the two are
distinct.
Id. at 703.

